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INTRODUCTION
The paper by Bourbousson et al. (2019) prompts discussion surrounding the complexity of
team cognitions in sport. The authors rightly recognize the importance of naturalistic settings
in developing cognitive components relating to teamwork, and the title suggests that enhancing
understanding of the setting can facilitate simulation studies. We applaud their efforts to drive this
important area, especially since they go beyond the perception-alone focus which has recently come
to dominate the area. Importantly, however, although we do not refute the connection between
naturalistic settings and growing interest in simulation studies, we have concerns regarding the
theoretical approaches they used to inform understanding of team cognitions, and the subsequent
methods suggested. Accordingly, we outline two key concerns and provide evidence that, although
to some extent we support the authors’ argument that investigating and developing team cognitions
(teamwork) is complex and requires the integration ofmultiple theories, the theoretical approaches,
and subsequent methods suggested may be limited.
Our first concern relates to the authors’ delimited application of NDM as a theoretical paradigm
to examine team cognition. To truly understand team cognitive processes, it is essential that
teamwork is examined within the naturalistic setting. Exploration of team cognitive processes
outside of the performance setting (in isolation of the playing context) risks the over inflation of
cognitive aspects (Williams, 2009). The point is that talking about it is not necessarily the same
as doing it! Indeed, the use of Shared Mental Models (SMMs—Richards et al., 2016) often acts a
priori to direct actions along certain lines, even if players don’t bother to articulate their rejection
of these options. Furthermore, basing arguments solely or overly on data around on-field verbal
interactions, whilst not pursuing the mental models developed off-field which also drive on-field
decision making, would seem an inappropriate delimitation. For example, our own work shows
how off-field activity, slower overt debate coupled with more time pressured activities, can be used
to develop and then drive on-field behavior. Importantly, this on-field behavior will often occur
with less, or even no overt verbalization between players. As a further consequence, and against the
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arguments of Bourbosson et al. that only a limited number
of players need to be involved in this, over verbalizations
may bear little or no relation to actually who, or what,
is driving the behavior. In short, research needs to look
at what is happening on the pitch but also why it is
happening, with the second element almost necessitating
off-field consideration.
In an attempt to address this “combination,” NDM researchers
seek to investigate how experts perform tasks in dynamic
environments that have ill-structured problems, changing
objectives, time constraints, include multiple players and
are influenced by organizational goals (Klein, 2008): all
characteristics representative of team sport (Richards et al., 2009).
Regrettably, such real-world approaches involve a high volume of
contextual information which have, until recently, been neglected
(Richards et al., 2016). Although recognition of the significance
of the naturalistic setting is shared with Bourbosson et al., we
feel their interpretation is limited with the exclusion of some key
data sources.
Theories emerging from the NDM paradigm such as
Recognition Primed Decision Making (RPD; Klein, 1998),
Situational Awareness (SA; Endsley and Garland, 2008), and
Sensemaking (Klein et al., 2007) make a valuable contribution
individually to enhance our understanding of team cognitive
process in a naturalistic setting. However, when integrated
collectively, they provide a comprehensive justification for the
possible approaches through which team cognitive processes
can be developed and explored. Furthermore, Klein (2000) has
identified five key cognitive processes involved in teamwork.
These include control of attention, shared situational awareness,
shared mental-models, application of strategies/heuristics,
and metacognitions. This commentary does not refute the
contribution from other theoretical approaches such as
neuroscience (Aglioti et al., 2008), motor control (Starkes and
Ericson, 2003; Williams, 2009) and other theories referred to
by Bourbosson et al. All have enhanced our understanding of
cognitive processes. However, we would argue such work is
limited as it has ignored the integration of both psychomotor
and psychosocial components which are required in sports
teams’ cognitive processes (Richards et al., 2009, 2012, 2016).
Such work examines performers’ cognitive processes in a range
of sports (hockey, Richards et al., 2009; netball, Richards et al.,
2012), team coaches’ and coach developers (Abraham et al.,
2009), and sports officials (Mascarenhas et al., 2005). Thus, as a
collective, these studies illustrate the important interplay between
psychomotor and psychosocial elements of team cognitions in a
naturalistic setting.
Our second concern rests with the limited methodological
approaches suggested for working within a naturalistic setting. As
stated above, and demonstrated in the body of work presented,
in-action decision-making is significantly (and, we suggest,
best) driven by mental models developed away from the field.
Consequently, it is impossible to consider team cognitions
in sport without drawing on Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA),
a methodology which has emerged from the NDM research
community. Relying on one methodological approach alone risks
presenting a biased and distorted understanding of teamwork.
By understanding what combination of cognitive and social
processes are involved in naturalistic teamwork, appropriate
methodologies (from the same paradigmatic approach) can be
employed to examine the specific processes, thus advancing our
understanding of how sports teams perform. CTA involves a
range of techniques concerned with the elicitation of knowledge
of experts (Hoffman and Militello, 2009) in a naturalistic
setting. Such techniques have proved successful in capturing
the unobservable cognitive processes, decisions, and judgements
embedded in expert performances (Chipman et al., 2000) and
subsequently, in the training/development of cognitive team
skills (Richards et al., 2012). Using multiple CTA methods
(for example, Critical Decision Method, Applied Cognitive
Task Analysis, and Concept Mapping) in one “combinatorics”
approach, allows the exploration of different cognitive and social
processes (Hoffman and Militello, 2009) to be examined within
team sports (Richards et al., 2016).
To conclude, it is paramount that when examining cognitive
processes within a naturalistic setting, a full range of theoretical
approaches from NDM are utilized. The methodologies
employed by NDM researchers are designed specifically
to examine the dynamic naturalistic setting—matching
epistemological and methodological assumptions. Application of
CTA allows researchers to focus on understanding how experts
perform a cognitive task in a naturalistic setting (Gore and
McAndrew, 2009) driven by in-situ and a priori inputs. Without
the inclusion of this breadth of data, only a partial picture can
possibly emerge.
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